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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires every complaint to
―contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
1
pleader is entitled to relief.‖ In a 2007 antitrust case, Bell Atlantic
2
Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court held that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a
plaintiff to plead ―enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
3
on its face.‖ This Article will refer to this determination as the
plausibility inquiry. In 2009, the Supreme Court‘s Ashcroft v. Iqbal
opinion confirmed that Twombly articulated a general standard of
4
pleading that applied outside of the antitrust context.
What followed these cases was a deluge of criticism: ―[The
Twombly holding] marks a fundamental—and unjustified—change in the
character of pretrial practice‖;5 ―[T]he court‘s majority messed up the
federal rules‖;6 ―Notice pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility
pleading‖;7 ―[Twombly represents] an untenable interpretation of Rule
8(a) that is wholly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent . . . ‖;8
―[T]oday, federal pleading standards are in crisis, thanks to [Twombly
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal]‖;9 ―Twombly and Iqbal have introduced a wild
card . . . at the threshold stage of civil process through which all
litigation must pass‖;10 ―[Twombly and Iqbal] have destabilized the
entire system of civil litigation‖;11 ―The majority view among academics
has been that robust efforts to regulate at the pleading stage are
wrongheaded and inconsistent with the traditional pleading standard the
Court has followed since Conley.‖12

1. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. Id. at 570.
4. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009).
5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21,
2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html?_r=1 (quoting
statement by Justice Ginsburg).
7. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008)
8. Id. at 460.
9. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295.
10. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 859.
11. Id. at 823.
12. Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us about Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B. U. L. REV. 1217, 1225
(2008).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss4/7

2

Brown: Reconstructing Pleading

2010]

RECONSTRUCTING PLEADING

1267

In this Article, I argue that much of this criticism is unjustified13
because it overlooks the analytical steps that occur before the plausibility
inquiry. Under a proper reading of Twombly and Iqbal, the plausibility
inquiry is not always necessary, and even when necessary, should be an
14
Additionally, commentators have generally
inquiry of last resort.
failed to appreciate the significant case management authority district
judges possess under the Federal Rules to help along a factually
15
deficient claim.
I develop this reading of Twombly and Iqbal more fully below by
providing a three-step framework for courts to apply when confronted
with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16
Properly applied, this three-step process will ameliorate
12(b)(6).
many, but not all, of the criticisms of Twombly and Iqbal.

13. Professor Robert Bone has reached a similar conclusion about the Twombly case. Robert
G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 877
(2009) (―[T]he Supreme Court‘s decision in Twombly does not alter pleading rules in as drastic a
way as many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose.‖). Although I agree with
Professor Bone‘s characterization of the case, I arrive at this conclusion for different reasons.
Professor Bone reached this conclusion before the Supreme Court decided the Iqbal case. It should
be noted, however, that Professor Bone has written critically about Iqbal. Robert G. Bone,
Plausibility Pleading Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849.
The actual impact of Twombly appears to have been more muted than some had expected.
See Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic
Corp v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (conducting a
study of Twombly‘s impact and concluding that the case ―appears to have had almost no substantive
impact,‖ except in civil rights cases where the impact ―does show a significant departure‖)
(emphasis added); but see Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 460 (noting that
―plausibility pleading is likely to stymie many valid claims . . .‖); Steinman, supra note 9, at 1296
(noting that ―Twombly‘s approach to pleading has been widely criticized as . . . having destructive
policy consequences in terms of litigants‘ access to federal courts‖).
14. Professor Adam Steinman makes a similar conclusion in his article
on Twombly and Iqbal on which this Article will heavily comment. See Steinman, supra note
9. Professor Steinman correctly notes that ―when a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations
on every element of a claim for relief, the plausibility issue vanishes completely.‖ Id. at 1316. This
leads to his conclusion that Twombly and Iqbal ―cannot faithfully be read to make a lack of
‗plausibility‘ grounds for disregarding a complaint‘s allegations.‖ Id. at 1319. I will argue,
however, that in some cases a plaintiff cannot plead a non-conclusory allegation on every element
of a claim for relief. For this reason, in some cases—e.g., cases where a defendant‘s state of mind is
an element of the claim for relief—Twombly and Iqbal require a court to engage in the plausibility
analysis. Twombly and Iqbal do make a lack of ―plausibility‖ grounds for dismissing a claim when
(1) an element of that claim cannot be alleged with a non-conclusory allegation or (2) a plaintiff has
not alleged an element of a claim with a non-conclusory allegation.
15. In making this argument, I will draw heavily on Professor Hartnett‘s piece on the two
decisions and make some small additions. See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010). This argument goes against the grain of most academic
commentary on Twombly and Iqbal.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Even if the critics of the Twombly and Iqbal cases do not agree
with my premise that the plausibility inquiry is a limited one, those critics should still support the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 4, Art. 7

1268

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[43:1265

Although critics have generally failed to appreciate the limited role
of the plausibility inquiry, it is still necessary in some cases. I will
therefore, in the discussion of plausibility within the three-step
framework, provide a general defense of Twombly and Iqbal by
recasting the decisions in light of a plaintiff‘s burden to certify to a court
that the factual contentions in a complaint ―will likely have evidentiary
17
support‖ under Rule 11. Under this view of the plausibility inquiry, a
court acts as a neutral third-party that simply evaluates a plaintiff‘s
ability to predict her own likelihood of success. Instead, a court
engaging in the plausibility inquiry gauges whether the plaintiff has
accurately predicted that his or her claim ―will likely have evidentiary
18
support.‖
To give a proper context to these arguments, I will begin in Part I
by providing a very short introduction to pleading practice before the
Supreme Court‘s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. In Part II, I will then
describe the Twombly and Iqbal cases in detail. After providing this
introductory discussion, I will proceed in Part III to develop the
arguments outlined above before briefly concluding in Part IV with a
short summary.
II. PLEADING PRACTICE BEFORE TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
This section will begin with the seminal Supreme Court
pronouncement on pleading, Conley v. Gibson,19 and then will then
move to discuss three more recent cases of Conley‘s progeny.20
A.

Conley v. Gibson, No Set of Facts, and the Importance of Notice

In Conley, a group of recently fired African-American railroad
workers brought suit against a union that was responsible for

proposed framework because it helps to ensure that the plausibility inquiry is made in a transparent
manner.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
18. FED. R. CIV. P 11(b).
19. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Conley is a prevalent enough authority on pleading that Justice
Stevens referred to the retirement of its language as ―rewrit[ing] the Nation‘s civil procedure
textbooks.‖ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Scott Dodson, Essay,
Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2007) (noting
that in Twombly, the Supreme Court ―gutted the venerable language from Conley[] that every civil
procedure professor and student can recite almost by heart‖).
20. For a much more informative and thorough discussion of the history and development of
pleading practice in federal courts before Twombly and Iqbal, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
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representing them.21 As interpreted at the time, the Railway Labor Act22
made it unlawful for a union representing members of a craft to make
distinctions among members of the union based on ―irrelevant and
23
When the plaintiffs‘ employer purported to
invidious‖ grounds.
―abolish‖ their positions, each had lost their job.24 Plaintiffs alleged that
the employer then filled the abolished positions with all white workers,
excepting ―a few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old
25
jobs but with loss of seniority.‖
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant union ―did nothing to protect
them against these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them
26
protection comparable to that given white employees.‖ Plaintiffs filed
their suit seeking to compel the defendant union to ―represent them
27
fairly.‖ The defendant sought to dismiss the plaintiffs‘ claims under
Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to ―set forth specific
facts to support its general allegations.‖28
In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, the Supreme Court
began by stating the ―accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.‖29 In finding the complaint sufficient, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that ―specific facts‖

21. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42.
22. 44 Stat. 577 (1926).
23. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944)
[I]t is enough for present purposes to say that the statutory power to represent a craft and
to make contracts as to wages, hours and working conditions does not include the
authority to make among members of the craft discriminations not based on such
relevant differences. Here the discriminations based on race alone are obviously
irrelevant and invidious.
Id.
24. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
25. Id.
26. Id. Professor Sherwin has explained that, at the time, ―unions negotiating employment
contracts with the railroad could not bargain for discriminatory terms, although there was no law
directly prohibiting railroads from discriminating against black employees.‖ Emily Sherwin, The
Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L. J. 73, 88 (2008).
27. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Id. at 45-46; see Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 435-36 (noting that ―[t]he
immediate effect of Conley was to put an end to the murmurs of opposition to the new pleading
standard of the Federal Rules and to clarify that yes, the new liberal rules mean what they say.‖).
Some have suggested that this language was ―rarely‖ taken literally. See Steinman, supra
note 9, at 1321 (quoting Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 434 (1986) (―How can a court ever be certain that a
plaintiff will prove no set of facts entitling him to relief?‖)).
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must support ―general allegations‖ in a complaint.30 According to the
Court, ―all the Rules require is ‗a short and plain statement of the claim‘
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s claim is
31
The Supreme Court also
and the grounds upon which it rests.‖
emphasized that the pleadings should not be read in a hyper technical
manner, and that decisions should be made on the merits: ―The Federal
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits.‖32
As Justice Stevens observed in his Twombly dissent, since Conley,
the Supreme Court had cited the no-set-of-facts language ―in a dozen
33
opinions . . . and four separate writings.‖ And ―[i]n not one of those
16 opinions was the language ‗questioned,‘ ‗criticized,‘ or ‗explained
away.‘‖34 Before Twombly, then, the no-set-of-facts language appeared
to have been fairly solid precedent.35

30. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
31. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
32. Id. at 48 (citing Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)). This notion of
pleading has been called the ―liberal ethos.‖ See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM L. REV. 433, 439 (1986); see also
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 228 (2004) (arguing that ―the
system of pleading should not unduly interfere with decisions on the merits‖). Professor Spencer
has suggested that Twombly may be ―a death blow to the liberal, open-access model of the federal
courts espoused by the early twentieth century law reformers.‖ Spencer, Plausibility Pleading,
supra note 7, at 433. Spencer terms the new pleading practice as the ―‗restrictive‘ or ‗efficiencyoriented‘ ethos.‖ Id.
33. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535
U.S. 813, 818 (2002)); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598
(1989); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New
Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Hospital
Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 521 (1972) (per curiam); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422 (1969) (plurality opinion);
see also Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 554 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 561, n.1 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 55, n.6 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment).
34. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577-78.
35. But see Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13 at 897 (―Long before the
Twombly decision, lower federal courts in the 1980s responded to this sense of crisis by tightening
up on pleading requirements. And they continued in this vein despite Supreme Court decisions to
the contrary in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz.‖) (citations removed); id. at 890 (noting that lower
courts, ―enthusias[tic] for heightened pleading . . . found ways to get around Leatherman and
Sweirkeiwicz‖).
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After Conley: Prohibiting Heightened Pleading Per Se

Since Conley, the Supreme Court has decided three additional
important cases on pleading under Rule 8(a): Leatherman v. Tarrant
36
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, Swierkiewicz v.
37
Sorema, and Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.38 I will briefly
explain each below.
In Leatherman, the Supreme Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit
decision that had expressly imposed a ―heightened pleading standard‖
39
The
for cases alleging a § 1983 violation against a municipality.
Supreme Court rejected the heightened pleading standard as ―impossible
to square . . . with the liberal system of ‗notice pleading‘ set up by the
Federal Rules.‖40 In reaching this conclusion, the Court echoed
41
Conley‘s focus on ―fair notice.‖ The Court additionally observed that
the Federal Rules had explicitly singled out those cases where
heightened pleading was necessary in Rule 9(b) (cases alleging ―fraud or
mistake‖),42 and a § 1983 claim against a municipality was not among
the claims listed in Rule 9(b).43 The Court also emphasized that the
Fifth Circuit‘s heightened pleading standard was problematic because it
would have effected an amendment to the Federal Rules by judicial
interpretation.44
In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court continued to abjure the use of
heightened pleading outside of those cases listed in Rule 9.45 There, the

36. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
37. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
38. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
39. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164.
40. Id. at 168.
41. Id. at 168 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
43. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (noting Rule 9(b) and stating the familiar Latin axiom:
―[e]xpressio unius est exclusion alterius‖).
44. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69.
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under §
1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a
result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment, federal courts and litigants
must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious
claims sooner rather than later.
Id. Critics of the Twombly case have noted the importance of this language. See, e.g., Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 453-54 (―[T]he rule amendment process is preferable because
it is a much more democratic, transparent, and accountable method of making changes to the
Federal Rules.‖).
45. Sweirkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Leatherman‘s language
rejecting heightened pleading standards by judicial interpretation). Professor Spencer suggests that
the Sweirkiewicz case was necessary because ―lower courts continued to impose heightened
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lower court had required the plaintiff in an employment discrimination
case to plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to
46
dismiss. In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that, in the context of
a case for employment discrimination, ―[t]he prima facie case . . . is an
47
evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.‖
The burdenshifting evidentiary standard of the prima facie case in employment
discrimination claims was inapplicable in the pleading context:
Before discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be
difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima facie
case in a particular case. Given that the prima facie case operates as a
flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid
48
pleading standard for discrimination cases.

The Supreme Court characterized the lower court‘s requirement of
pleading the prima facie case as a ―heightened pleading standard,‖ and,
like in Leatherman, the Court rejected its use.49 The Court again
reemphasized that ―[t]h[e] simplified notice pleading standard relies on
liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.‖50
In the third important case, Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme
Court began a slight break from the liberal attitude to pleading evinced
in Conley, Leatherman, and Sweikerwicz.51 There, the plaintiffs had
brought a class action for securities fraud against Dura Pharmaceuticals,
alleging that the company had ―falsely claimed that it expected the FDA
would soon grant its approval‖ of one of its products, a new asthmatic
spray device.52 The plaintiffs, in claiming that they were damaged by
the false statement, stated: ―In reliance on the integrity of the market,
[the plaintiffs] paid artificially inflated prices for Dura securities and the
plaintiffs suffered damage[s] thereby.‖53
pleading in many cases.‖ Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 437-38 (citing
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1011-59 (2003)
(describing cases)).
46. Sweirkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
47. Id. at 510.
48. Id. at 512.
49. Id. at 511.
50. Id. at 512 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)); Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993). Professor Bone
suggests that the Twombly Court‘s skepticism of district judge case management as panacea for
discovery burdens ―may be the most important part of the Twombly opinion—perhaps even more
important than the discussion of Conley.‖ Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 898.
51. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
52. Id. at 339.
53. Id. at 340 (emphasis removed) (internal quotations removed).
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In moving to dismiss the plaintiffs‘ complaint, the defendant argued
that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead an economic loss or ―a
causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the
54
The Court agreed and held that the plaintiffs‘ allegation that
loss.‖
they ―suffered damage[s]‖ was insufficient.55
According to the Court, an artificially inflated purchase price did
not necessarily show a loss or cause a loss even when the securities were
56
resold later at a lower price. The artificially high price did not show a
loss because ―the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a
share that at that instant possesses equivalent value.‖57
The Court read the plaintiffs‘ complaint as attempting to support
the ―suffered damage[s]‖ allegation by pleading that the share price was
58
The blanket allegation of
artificially inflated at the time of the sale.
damages supported by an allegation of an inflated purchase price was,
however, insufficient.59 This was true even though the inflated price
may ―‗touch upon‘ a later economic loss,‖ and ―will sometimes play a
role in bringing about a future loss.‖60 The inflated purchase price,
without more, was insufficient to state a claim for economic loss.61 The
Court suggested, however, that the plaintiffs could have saved their
complaint by ―claim[ing] that [defendant]‘s share price fell significantly
after the truth became known.‖62
To summarize: After Conley, the function of the complaint was to
―merely ‗give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.‘‖63 The Court reemphasized the

54. Id. at 342.
55. Id. at 348.
56. Id. at 347.
57. Id. at 342 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 347 (―The complaint‘s failure to claim that Dura‘s share price fell significantly after
the truth became known suggests that the plaintiffs considered the allegation of purchase price
inflation alone sufficient. The complaint contains nothing that suggests otherwise.‖).
59. Id. at 346.
60. Id. at 343 (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 347.
63. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1321 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see
also Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 434 (―Since the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1938, notice pleading has been the watchword for the system of pleading in
federal civil courts.‖); see also id. at 438 (noting that before Twombly and Iqbal, ―whether the
possibility of recovery is likely or remote was rendered irrelevant; what mattered was whether the
statement of the claim gave the defendant ‗fair notice‘ of the claim and its basis.‖); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (―Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a
judge‘s disbelief of a complaint‘s factual allegations.‖); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(noting that dismissal is not appropriate even it appears ―that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely‖).
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importance of notice pleading in Leatherman and Sweikerwicz. In Dura
Pharmaceuticals, a bridge between Conley and Twombly, the Court
began scaling back on Conley‘s liberal language on pleading.
III. TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
Twombly and Iqbal discuss pleading and the motion to dismiss in
different terms than in previous cases. Briefly, Twombly and Iqbal
describe two new ―lines‖ that a plaintiff must ―cross[]‖ to sufficiently
plead a claim for relief: (1) ―the line between the conclusory and the
factual‖; and (2) ―the line between ―the factually neutral and the
64
factually suggestive.‖ Below, I will describe these two lines and the
Twombly and Iqbal opinions in detail. I will then make the argument
that this new terminology does not change pleading practice as much as
commentators have assumed.
A.

Twombly: The Line between the Factually Neutral and the
Factually Suggestive

As the Supreme Court did in deciding Twombly, before proceeding
to the legal analysis, it is necessary to provide some background on the
Twombly case.65 The history of this litigation can be traced all the way
back to the 1984 divestiture of AT&T‘s local telephone business. The
divestiture had generated a great deal of litigation and the Supreme
Court had itself confronted issues stemming from the divestiture several
times.66
In 1984, AT&T‘s local telephone business was divided up into to
regional service monopolies called Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(ILECs).67 Congress, however, became displeased with the operation of
the
regional
monopolies,
and
eventually
enacted
the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,68 which imposed on the ILECs ―a
host of duties intended to facilitate market entry‖69 for competitors.70
As the Court had explained, ―‗[c]entral to the [new] scheme [was each

64. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.5 (2007).
65. This background will be lifted from Justice Souter‘s majority opinion in Twombly. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-52.
66. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Verizon Communications
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; see also
Covad Comm. Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
67. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549. The ILECs have also been called ―Baby Bells.‖ Id.
68. 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
69. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 371.
70. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.
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ILEC‘s] obligation . . . to share its network with competitors.‘‖71 The
competitors were known as ―competitive local exchange carriers‖
(CLECs).72 In enacting this legislation, Congress had apparently
―expected some ILECs to become CLECs in the legacy territories of
other ILECs,‖ but this never occurred.73
Despite that 1996 Act, then, the CLECs failed to achieve
meaningful competition with the ILECs, and the ILECs failed to
74
The plaintiffs in Twombly
meaningfully compete with each other.
brought a class action complaint alleging that ILECs engaged in a
―contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
75
The complaint
commerce‖ in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
alleged conduct directed at demonstrating two separate conspiracies: (1)
a conspiracy among the ILECs to inhibit the growth and market entry of
the CLECs in the same ways (the ―no-market-entry-for-CLECs
conspiracy‖); and (2) a conspiracy among the ILECs to refrain from
competing with each other (the ―no-competition-among-ILECs
conspiracy‖).76
According to Justice Souter, writing for the majority, the plaintiffs
did not ―directly allege illegal agreement; in fact, they proceed[ed]
exclusively via allegations of parallel conduct, as both the District Court
and Court of Appeals recognized.‖77 The Court made this conclusion
despite the plaintiffs‘ allegation that ―[d]efendants . . . engaged in a
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry . . .
[and] agree[d] not to compete with one another and to stifle attempts by
others to compete with them.‖78 The Court read this allegation as a
71. Id. (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402) (alterations in original). The ILECs ―vigorously
litigated the scope of the [new] sharing obligation.‖ Id. at 549. As a result of this litigation, the
FCC ―three times revised its regulations to narrow the range of network elements to be shared with
the CLECs.‖ Id. at 549-50 (citing Covad Communications, 450 F.3d at 533-34).
72. Id. at 549.
73. Id. at 569 (―The upshot is that Congress may have expected some ILECs to become
CLECs in the legacy territories of other ILECs, but the disappointment does not make a conspiracy
plausible.‖).
74. Id. at 551.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (making unlawful ―[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations‖); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551.
76. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51.
77. Id. at 565 n.11, 564 (―[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim
on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual agreement
among the ILECs.‖). This explains the somewhat tortured language I use below to describe the
plaintiffs‘ allegations.
78. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 n.2 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at
64), Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F.Supp.2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220)
[hereinafter Twombly Complaint]).
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―legal conclusion[] resting on the prior allegations.‖79 Finding that no
agreement had been directly alleged, the Court focused on the
allegations that the plaintiffs pleaded that tended to suggest an
80
agreement.
As to the no-market-entry-for-CLECs conspiracy, the plaintiffs
alleged that this conspiracy could be seen by the ILECs ―parallel
conduct‖ that ―included making unfair agreements with the CLECs for
access to ILEC networks, providing inferior connections to the
networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the
81
According to the
CLECs‘ relations with their own customers.‖
plaintiffs, the ILECs‘ ―‗compelling common motivation[n]‘‖ to thwart
the CLECs‘ competitive efforts naturally led them to form a
82
conspiracy.‖
As to the no-competition-among-ILECs conspiracy, the plaintiffs
alleged that the ILECs failed to meaningfully pursue attractive business
opportunities in adjacent markets where they would have had substantial
competitive advantages.83 Additionally, the plaintiffs noted that Richard
Notebaert, an ILEC CEO, stated in an interview that competing in the
residual territory of an ILEC ―might be a good way to turn a quick dollar
but that doesn‘t make it right.‖84 The majority held that, despite these
allegations, the complaint did not contain ―enough facts to state a claim
85
to relief that [wa]s plausible on its face.‖
In reaching this conclusion, the majority began by first examining
the requirements necessary to prove a § 1 claim.86 Previously, the Court
had held that, at the summary judgment stage, ―a § 1 plaintiff‘s offer of
conspiracy evidence must tend to rule out the possibility that the
defendants were acting independently.‖87 At the summary judgment
stage, then, a plaintiff must show more than parallel business conduct
and more than ―even ‗conscious parallelism‘‖88 because this activity
does not tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants were acting
independently. Noting that the sufficiency of allegations at the pleading

79. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
80. Id. at 565.
81. Id. at 550-51.
82. Id. at 551 (quoting Twombly Complaint, supra note 78, ¶ 50 (alteration in original)).
83. Id. (citing Twombly Complaint, supra note 78, ¶¶ 40-41).
84. Id. at 551 (quoting Twombly Complaint, supra note 78, ¶ 42).
85. Id. at 570.
86. Id. at 553.
87. Id. at 554.
88. Id. at 553-54 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 227 (1993)).
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stage is an ―antecedent question‖ to the sufficiency of proof at trial and
at summary judgment, the Court held that to state a claim under § 1, ―a
complaint [must allege] with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
89
The Court noted that the
suggest that an agreement was made.‖
―‗crucial question‘ [wa]s whether the challenged anticompetitive
conduct stem[med] from independent decision or from an agreement,
tacit or express.‖90
According to the Court, though, the factual matter pleaded by the
plaintiffs did not suggest an agreement.91 As to conduct pleaded to infer
the no-market-entry-for-CLECs agreement, the Court noted that,
―nothing in the complaint intimate[d] that the resistance to the upstarts
was anything more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC
92
intent on keeping its regional dominance.‖ As to the conduct pleaded
to infer no-competition-among-ILECs agreement, the court noted that ―a
natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the former
Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their
neighbors to do the same thing.‖93
The Court rejected the inference of an agreement that the plaintiffs
drew from their allegations.94 According to the Court, the allegations in
the complaint failed to cross the line between the factually neutral and
the factually suggestive and were therefore not plausible.95 In a
footnote, the Court noted that, in addition to the line between factually
neutral and factually suggestive covered in Twombly, to plausibly state a
claim for relief, the allegations in the complaint must also cross ―the line
between the conclusory and the factual.‖ 96

89. Id. at 556.
90. Id. at 553 (quoting Theatre Enterprises Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 540 (1953)).
91. Id. at 566.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 568. Justice Stevens, in dissent, criticized the majority in this sense for ―engag[ing]
in arm-chair economics.‖ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 569.
95. Id. But see Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 446-47.
Under the traditional rule, factual allegations that were consistent with liability passed
muster because courts were required to draw any permissible inferences in the plaintiff's
favor, permissible here meaning those inferences simply consistent with the stated
allegations. Thus, in the Twombly case, the courts should have been able—at the
pleading stage—to infer from parallel conduct and the lack of competition among the
ILECs, coupled with the statement of one of the ILEC presidents regarding the
impropriety of such competition, that there was some agreement among the ILECs to
restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
Id.
96. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5.
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After Twombly, there was still some ―hope‖ among those criticizing
the case that it ―might be narrowly confined to complex antitrust
97
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent in Twombly, wondered
cases.‖
―[w]hether the Court‘s actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust
treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a
98
complaint w[ould] inure to the benefit of all civil defendants.‖ This
question was answered in Iqbal, where the Supreme Court definitively
stated: ―Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for
99
‗all civil actions.‘‖
B.

Iqbal: The Line between the Conclusory and the Factual

The Iqbal case addressed the line noted, but left unaddressed in
Twombly: the line between the conclusory and the factual. As in the
discussion of Twombly, a brief background discussion will help to frame
the legal issues. The Iqbal case involved the September 11 attacks and
the FBI investigation that followed: ―The September 11 attacks were
perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted themselves
members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group.
Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—
and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples.‖100
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, ―the FBI questioned more
than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks in particular or to
terrorism in general.‖101 Following this questioning, ―some 762‖ of the
individuals were held on immigrations charges, and 184 of those held on
immigration charges ―w[ere] deemed to be of high interest to the
investigation.‖102 Once an individual was determined to be of high
interest, the individual was ―held under restrictive conditions designed to
prevent . . . communicati[on] with the general prison population or the
outside world.‖103
In Iqbal, the plaintiff was one of the individuals that was arrested
on immigration charges and was also one of the individuals designated
as ―of high interest.‖104 Because he was deemed to be ―of high interest,‖
he was placed in a high security housing unit, the Administrative

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Steinman, supra note 9, at 1296.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
Id. at 1951.
Id. at 1943.
Id. at 1943.
Id.
Id.
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Maximum Special Housing Unit (―ADMAX SHU‖).105 While housed in
ADMAX SHU, the plaintiff was: (1) ―kicked . . . in the stomach,
punched . . . in the face, and dragged . . . across his cell without
106
(2) ―subjected . . . to serial strip and body-cavity
justification‖;
searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or others‖;107 and (3)
refused the opportunity, along with other Muslims to pray and was told
108
The plaintiff brought
that there would be ―[n]o prayers for terrorists.‖
a complaint against numerous federal officers, including John Ashcroft,
the former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller,
109
the Director of the FBI.
Only defendants Ashcroft and Mueller, however, were before the
Supreme Court in Iqbal and the Court accordingly focused specifically
on the allegations in the complaint connecting either Ashcroft or Mueller
110
The plaintiff pleaded:
to Iqbal‘s alleged harsh treatment.
In the months after September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), under the direction of Defendant MUELLER,
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men, designated
herein as post-September 11th detainees, as part of its investigation of
the events of September 11.
...
The policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were cleared by the
FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.
...
Defendants ASHCROFT [and] MUELLER . . . each knew of,
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiffs to
these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on
account of their religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
111
legitimate penological interest.

105. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943.
106. Id. at 1944. (internal quotations omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 1942.
110. Id. at 1944 (―The allegations against [Ashcroft and Mueller] are the only ones relevant
here.‖). Although ultimately dismissing the claims against Ashcroft and Mueller, the Court noted
that ―[Iqbal‘s] account of his prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional
misconduct by some governmental actors. But the allegations and pleadings with respect to these
actors are not before us here.‖ Id. at 1942.
111. Complaint at ¶¶ 47, 69, 96, Ashcroft v. Elmaghraby, No. 04 CV 01809 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 27,
2005) [hereinafter Iqbal Complaint].
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In identifying Ashcroft as a Defendant, the plaintiff described him
as having ―ultimate responsibility for the implementation and
enforcement of the immigration and federal criminal laws. He [wa]s a
principal architect of the policies and practices challenged [in the
112
The plaintiff described Mueller as being ―instrumental
complaint].‖
in the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of the policies and
113
practices challenged [in the complaint].‖
In analyzing the complaint, the Court began by observing that the
Twombly Court ―found it necessary first to discuss the antitrust
114
Following course, the Court
principles implicated by the complaint.‖
stated it would ―begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials
115
The Court then
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.‖
described Iqbal‘s complaint for ―invidious discrimination in
contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments,‖ as a claim under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.116 A Bivens action is
an implied cause of action against federal officials for a violation of a
constitutional right.117 The cause of action is ―disfavored,‖118 and the
Court has therefore ―been reluctant to extend Bivens liability ‗to any new
context or new category of defendants.‘‖119 Where Bivens does apply, it
―is the ‗federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.‘‖120
The Court explained that, for a Bivens claim, ―the plaintiff must
plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory
purpose.‖121 To prove a discriminatory purpose, though, a plaintiff must
show more than ―‗intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences.‘‖122 A plaintiff must show that a defendant adopted a
course of action ―‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite of,‘ [the action‘s]
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.‖123 Accordingly, the Court
stated, the plaintiff ―must plead sufficient factual matter to show that
112. Id. ¶ 10.
113. Id. ¶ 11.
114. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947.
115. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007)).
116. Id. at 1948.
117. Id. at 1947.
118. Id. at 1948.
119. Id. (quoting Correctional Service Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)).
120. Id. (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)).
121. Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540-41 (1993));
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
122. Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass v. Freeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
123. Id. (quoting Freeney, 442 U.S. at 279) (alternation in original).
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[Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and implemented the detention policies
at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of
discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.‖124
Before proceeding to determine if the plaintiff‘s complaint crossed
the line between factually neutral and factually suggestive,125 the Court
discussed the line between the conclusory and the factual mentioned in a
footnote in Twombly: ―In keeping with these principles a court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
126
The Court noted that it had
entitled to the assumption of truth.‖
followed this practice in Twombly: the Twombly Court ―first noted that
the plaintiffs‘ assertion of an unlawful agreement was a ‗legal
127
conclusion‘ and, as such, was not entitled to the assumption of truth.‖
The Court excised the following allegations from the complaint:
―[Ashcroft] is a principal architect of the policies and practices
challenged here.‖128
―[Ashcroft] . . . knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject Plaintiffs to these conditions of confinement as a
matter of policy, solely on account of their religion, race, and/or
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.‖129

Most important was the Court‘s rejecting the allegations that
Ashcroft and Mueller ―willfully . . . agreed to subject [Plaintiffs] to
harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account
of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin.‖130 Recall that to recover
on a Bivens action, a violation of a constitutional right does not equal
intent; the plaintiff must prove that the motivation behind the violation
was discriminatory.131
The Court then noted the allegations that it found well-pleaded:

124. Id. at 1948-49. An interesting note about the phrasing in Iqbal is the focus on opening the
doors to discovery, rather than opening the doors to the district courts. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950
(―Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.‖); cf. Phillips v. Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (―Few issues in civil
procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading standards, which are the key that opens
access to courts.‖).
125. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.5 (2007).
126. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
127. Id. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
128. Id. at 1944; id. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111 ¶ 10.
129. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 96.
130. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
131. Id. at 1948.
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―In the months after September 11, 2001, the [FBI], under the
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of
Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of
September 11.‖132
―The policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‗cleared‘ by the
FBI was approved by [Ashcroft and Mueller] in discussions in the
weeks after September 11, 2001.‖133

Having distilled the complaint down to its well-pleaded allegations,
the Court moved to the plausibility analysis. In a statement that has
generated much controversy following Iqbal, the Court noted that,
―whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
134
The majority searched the
judicial experience and common sense.‖
complaint for ―any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest
[Ashcroft‘s and Mueller‘s] discriminatory state of mind.‖135
Of the remaining, non-conclusory allegations, only two spoke to the
discriminatory state of mind: the 1000s-of-arrests allegation and the
hold-until-cleared-discussions allegation.
On the 1000s-of-arrests
allegation, the Court found that the ―disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims‖ was not enough to state a plausible claim that Ashcroft and
Mueller subjected the plaintiff to the harsh conditions because he was a
Muslim.136 As to the hold-until-cleared-discussions allegation, the
Court found that ―[a]ll it plausibly suggests is that the Nation‘s top law
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack,
sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.‖137
On this point of plausibility—i.e., whether the majority‘s cherrypicked allegations plausibility suggested discriminatory intent—the
Court was unanimous.138 Writing for the remaining four Justices in
dissent, Justice Souter stated: ―I agree that the two allegations selected

132. Id. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 47.
133. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 69.
134. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 1952.
136. Id. at 1951 (―It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.‖).
137. Id. at 1952.
138. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
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by the majority, standing alone, do not state a plausible entitlement to
relief for unconstitutional discrimination.‖139
For the purposes of this Article then,140 the disagreement in Iqbal
was solely over the majority‘s disregarding of certain allegations as
conclusory. Justice Souter read the complaint as suggesting that
Ashcroft and Mueller ―helped to create the discriminatory policy [the
141
The disagreement, then, is whether
plaintiff] has described.‖
plaintiff‘s statement that Ashcroft was the ―principal architect‖142 of a
policy that subjected plaintiff to the harsh conditions of confinement
143
―solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin‖ was
conlcusory or factual. This disagreement will be explained more fully
below.
To summarize: After Twombly and Iqbal, in adjudicating a motion
to dismiss, the two crucial questions are (1) whether the allegations have
crossed the line between the conclusory and the factual, and (2) whether
the allegations have crossed the line between the factually neutral and
the factually suggestive.
To guide courts in answering these questions, I will below describe
a three-step process gleaned from Twombly and Iqbal that will provide
methodological consistency. This approach will also relegate the
plausibility inquiry to its proper role as an inquiry of last resort, and will
ensure that, if necessary, the plausibility inquiry will be done
transparently. This reading demonstrates that many of the criticisms of
Twombly and Iqbal are overstated. Additionally, in discussing the
plausibility inquiry, the final of the three steps, I will provide new
interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal in light of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 and suggest again that much of the criticism of the two
cases is overstated.
IV. THE THREE-STEP PROCESS
Briefly, in adjudicating a motion to dismiss, a court should: (1)
identify the elements of a claim that a plaintiff will ultimately need to
prove on the legal theory that a defendant seeks to have dismissed; (2)
excise from the complaint conclusory allegations; and (3) determine
whether the remaining non-conclusory allegations directly allege each

139. Id.
140. Justice Souter in dissent also strongly disagreed with the majority‘s legal analysis of the
requirements for a Bivens claim. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954-55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting).
142. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 10.
143. Id. ¶ 96 (emphasis added).
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element of the claim, and if not, determine whether the non-conclusory
allegations that indirectly allege an element of a claim suggest more than
a possibility that the plaintiff will be able to prove his or her claim.
A.

The Elements of the Cause of Action

Exactly how a court should define the elements of a cause of action
144
at the pleading stage has received relatively little scholarly attention.
Professor Charles Campbell, however, has suggested that a plaintiff
must plead ―factual allegations in plain language touching (either
directly or by inference) all material elements necessary to recover under
145
I agree with Professor Campbell: Under Twombly
substantive law.‖
and Iqbal a plaintiff must plead factual matter that speaks to each
element of a claim for relief. This statement seems obvious, but is
confused by the Sweirkeiwicz case, where the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case to survive a motion to
dismiss.146 A close reading of Sweirkeiwicz, however, reveals that the
holding is not inconsistent with requiring a plaintiff to plead to each
element of a claim for relief.
Before the Sweirkeiwicz case, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, the Supreme Court outlined the plaintiff‘s evidentiary burden at
the summary judgment stage and referred to this as a prima facie case.147
The Court required a plaintiff to show ―(1) membership in a protected
group; (2) qualification for the job in question; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) circumstances that support an inference of
discrimination.‖148
In rejecting the Fifth Circuit‘s requirement that a plaintiff to plead
each of these four elements, the Court noted that the prima facie case
requirements were an ―evidentiary standard‖149 that ―set forth the basic
144. Professor Spencer has previously touched on this. Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra
note 7, at 487 (―To the extent that Twombly endorses parity between the level of scrutiny applied to
claims at the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 stages—with the only distinction being that between alleged
facts and evidenced facts—such a development is unwelcome.‖).
145. Charles B. Campbell, A ‘Plausible’ Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9
NEV. L. J. 1, 22 (2008). Professor Emily Sherwin, however, has argued that ―no one maintains that
plaintiffs must specify the elements of a legal cause of action in their complaints.‖ Emily Sherwin,
The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L. J. 73, 75 (2008).
146. Sweirkeiwicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (―This Court has never indicated that
the requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the
pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss.‖).
147. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
148. Sweirkeiwicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
149. Id. (―In McDonnell Douglas, this Court made clear that ‗[t]he critical issue before us
concern[ed] the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment
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allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII
case alleging discriminatory treatment.‖150 Once a plaintiff presented
enough evidence to establish a prima facie case, this created a
―presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the
employee.‖151
But, to prove employment discrimination, a plaintiff does not
always need to present circumstances that support an inference of
discrimination. Instead, as the Sweirkeiwicz Court noted, ―if a plaintiff
is able to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail
152
without proving all the elements of a prima facie case.‖
In Sweirkeiwicz, the Court referred to the requirement of pleading a
prima facie case as a ―heightened pleading standard‖ that ―conflict[ed]
153
As Campbell notes,
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).‖
―Swierkiewicz rejected using an evidentiary standard as a pleading
standard; it did not reject measuring the sufficiency of a complaint by
whether it alleged all of the elements necessary to recover.‖154 Indeed,
the Court rejected the prima-facie-case pleading standard because it
required pleading more than all of the elements necessary to recover.155
Additionally, the material-elements pleading requirement is
consistent with the Supreme Court‘s unanimous opinion in Dura
Pharmaceuticals. There, in determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff‘s
complaint, the Court first examined what a plaintiff would ultimately
―need to prove.‖156 The Court identified all the elements necessary to
succeed on a securities fraud action, and found that the plaintiff failed to
plead two of them: ―what the relevant economic loss might be or of what
the causal connection might be between that loss and the
misrepresentation.‖157 Because the plaintiff had failed to ―giv[e] any

discrimination.‘‖) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800) (alteration and emphasis in
Sweirteiwicz).
150. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
151. Id. at 254.
152. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
153. Id. at 512.
154. Campbell, supra note 149 at 23. Moore‘s Federal Practice suggests that ―[t]he Supreme
Court had rejected the idea that courts should measure a pleading‘s adequacy by the elements of a
claim.‖ 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 8.04[1a] (3d ed. 2010). John
P. Lenich, however, says that ―[t]he authors [of Moore‘s Federal Practice] are wrong.‖ John P.
Lenich, Notice Pleading Comes to Nebraska: Part I—Pleading Claims for Relief, NEB. LAW., Sept.
2002, at 2, 7 n.12.
155. Sweirkeiwicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
156. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
157. Id. at 347.
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indication of the economic loss and proximate cause,‖158 the Court held
159
that the complaint was insufficient.
When adjudicating a motion to dismiss, as the Court did in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Twombly, and Iqbal, a court should begin the analysis
by identifying the minimum elements a plaintiff must prove to recover
on the cause of action for which the defendant seeks dismissal. A court
only needs to complete this process on those particular legal theories on
which the defendant seeks to foreclose the plaintiff‘s recovery. This first
step in the three-step process existed before Twombly and Iqbal and
should therefore be unobjectionable to those critical of the plausibility
inquiry. Additionally, determining the elements of a claim is a legal
question, which is proper at the pleading stage.160
B.

Defining Conclusory

After defining the elements of the cause of action on which the
defendant seeks dismissal, a court should closely examine the complaint
and excise those allegations that are conclusory.161 Defining conclusory
is a difficult task, partly because the Federal Rules attempted to move
away from the language of ―facts,‖ ―ultimate facts,‖ and ―conclusions‖
with Rule 8(a)‘s short-plain-statement language.162 Indeed, the drafters
of Rule 8 ―intentionally avoided any reference to ‗facts‘ or ‗evidence‘ or
‗conclusions.‘‖163
Because this line between the conclusory and the factual appears to
have been drawn (or at least received significant attention) for the first
time in Iqbal, its definition must be found there. As noted above in the
158. Id.
159. Id. at 438.
160. One potential problem, however, with this approach is that it may increase the workload
of courts because it requires courts to identify the legal elements of the claim. I contend, however,
that based on Dura Pharmaceuticals, this was already the practice in federal courts—if a plaintiff
does not plead any allegation that speaks to a claim for relief, the court should dismiss the claim.
The proposed approach here simply asks courts to make the identification of the elements of a cause
of action more systematically.
161. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (instructing courts to ―begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.‖).
162. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 891 (―[N]ineteenth-century judges
applied the code rules in a hyper-technical fashion, insisting on ‗strict and logical accuracy‘ and
drawing hopeless distinctions among allegations of ultimate fact, legal conclusions, and evidentiary
facts.‖) (citations omitted).
163. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (―The substitution
of ‗claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief‘ for the code formulation of the ‗facts‘
constituting a ‗cause of action‘ was intended to avoid the distinctions drawn under the codes among
‗evidentiary facts,‘ ‗ultimate facts,‘ and ‗conclusions‘ . . . .‖)).
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description of Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had failed
to adequately allege that Ashcroft and Mueller intentionally formulated
the plan of restrictive confinement to subject the plaintiff to his
164
mistreatment in confinement because of some discriminatory animus.
Importantly, the Court noted that it did not disregard the allegations
because they were ―unrealistic or nonsensical.‖165
In this process, the Court excised from the complaint the allegation
that ―ASHCROFT [and] MUELLER . . . willfully . . . agreed to subject
[Iqbal] to the[] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
166
legitimate penological interest,‖ and the allegation that Ashcroft was
167
the ―principal architect‖
of the policy and Mueller was
168
in carrying it out. The Court characterized these as
―instrumental‖
―bald allegations‖ and found them not well-pleaded.169
In contrast, the Court found as non-conclusory the allegations that
(1) ―[i]n the months after September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), under the direction of Defendant MUELLER,
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men, designated herein
as post-September 11th detainees, as part of its investigation of the
events of September 11,‖170 and (2) ―[t]he policy of holding postSeptember-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement
until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by Defendants
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after
September 11, 2001.‖171
Justice Souter, writing in dissent in Iqbal, faulted the majority‘s
analysis on this point saying, ―[b]y my lights, there is no principled basis
for the majority‘s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and
Mueller to their subordinates‘ discrimination.‖172
So the question becomes: what is the difference between the
allegations that the Court held conclusory and those allegations that the
Court found well-pleaded?

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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1. Elements of a Claim that are only Indirectly Perceptible
Professor Steinman has provided a definition of the line between
the conclusory and the factual: ―an allegation is conclusory only when it
fails to identify adequately the acts or events (or, one might say, the
transactions or occurrences) that entitle the plaintiff to relief from the
173
defendant.‖
I suggest a similar, although not identical, definition. An allegation
in a complaint is conclusory when the allegation attempts to plead
directly an element of a claim that is only indirectly sensory-perceptible.
By sensory perceptible, I mean capable of being perceived by any of the
five senses. To illustrate, I provide several examples, none of which is
entirely conclusory:
1.
2.

Defendant fired Plaintiff because she was a woman.
During a performance review, Defendant stated that clients have
complained about doing business with a woman.
3. Plaintiff heard Defendant make a joke and laugh when she exited
the room.
4. Defendant failed to use gender-neutral language in his intraoffice memoranda.
5. Defendant fired Plaintiff because of his hostility to women which
he demonstrated by his constant telling of sexist jokes in the
office.

In allegation one, the Defendant‘s firing of the Plaintiff is sensory
perceptible. An employer cannot fire an individual without some
sensory perceptible action—a phone call that the individual can hear, or
a letter that an individual can see and read. In allegations two, the
Defendant‘s statement is sensory-perceptible by hearing; likewise in
allegation three. In allegation four, the use of the pronouns could have
been seen while Defendant was at his desk typing, or could have been
seen by reading the memoranda. Allegation five is sensory-perceptible
because the jokes could be heard.
But parts of allegations one and five are not directly sensory
perceptible—these are the allegations that state the Defendant‘s motive
for the firing. A motivation cannot be directly perceived; it can only be
perceived indirectly. One can only know an individual‘s state of mind

173. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1298. Professor Spencer, although not addressing the issue
in the same way, has suggested that a non-conclusory allegation is one ―of observed or experienced
objective facts about what transpired.‖ (emphasis added). A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding
Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009).
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through those sensory-perceptible actions that tend to evince motivation.
Allegations two through four are all examples of sensory-perceptible
allegations that can evince the Defendant‘s intent.
It is important to note, though, that in the hypothetical complaint,
combining a sensory-perceptible allegation with an imperceptible
allegation does not transform the latter into a non-conclusory allegation.
This is true even if the plaintiff says that the sensory-perceptible
allegation demonstrates the imperceptible element. For example, in
allegation five, the allegation about the sexist jokes is sensoryperceptible and therefore well-pleaded. But the ―because-of‖ part of the
allegation—that ―Defendant fired Plaintiff because of his hostility to
women‖—is not directly perceptible. The Plaintiff‘s linking of these
two allegations in a single paragraph, and suggesting that the jokes prove
the intent, does not transform the allegation on the Defendant‘s state of
mind into a non-conclusory allegation. This rule can be lifted from
Dura Pharmaceuticals. There, the plaintiffs alleged damages and the
court read the complaint as linking the allegation of an artificially
inflated price (which is a directly sensory-perceptible fact) with the
174
The Court nonetheless held that the allegation was
damages.
175
insufficient.
As further support, in Papasan v. Allain,176 the Court
noted that ―[a]lthough for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we
must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.‖177
This definition of conclusory described above can be seen in Iqbal.
There, a meeting between Ashcroft and Mueller where they
―discussed‖178 the policy of the restrictive conditions of confinement
could have been seen and heard. Ashcroft‘s intention in implementing
the policy, that he did it ―solely on account of their religion, race, and/or
national origin,‖179 however, is only indirectly perceptible. One can try
to understand Ashcroft‘s intent by what one hears him saying, or what
one sees him doing, but one cannot perceive what his motivation is.
It is important to note that a plaintiff cannot always avoid the
plausibility inquiry by simply pleading sensory-perceptible allegations

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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on each of the elements of a cause of action.180 Some elements cannot
be pleaded directly with sensory-perceptible allegations. When a statute
or common law rule makes intent an element of a claim, a plaintiff
cannot directly plead that element with a non-conclusory allegation.
Again, this can be seen in Iqbal. There, the plaintiff pleaded a nonconclusory allegation—the arrest and detention of thousands of Arab
Muslim men after September 11: ―[T]he [FBI], under the direction of
Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim
181
men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.‖
This is a sensory-perceptible allegation that tends to show Mueller‘s and
Ashcroft‘s state of mind. Although the plaintiff did not explicitly allege
the connection between the two, the plaintiff‘s failure to explicitly make
182
Conversely, a
the connection did not cause the allegation to fail.
plaintiff‘s explicitly connecting the two should not make the allegation
sufficient. Similarly, in the Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Court read the
complaint as the plaintiff making this connection, but this was still not
enough. Again, whether a claim is well-pleaded should not turn on the
plaintiff‘s artfully connecting a non-conclusory allegation with an
element of a claim that cannot be directly pleaded—this type of
hypertechnical rule is a result that the Federal Rules sought to avoid.183
The only way to plead intent is to provide the court with sensoryperceptible allegations that indirectly speak to the element. When a
cause of action requires as an element some level of intent—or some
other element that is not itself directly sensory-perceptible—the plaintiff
must plead around this requirement with other sensory-perceptible
allegations.
2 Directly Perceptible Elements that are Pleaded Indirectly
Twombly, however, necessitates a second part of the definition of
conclusory. An allegation in a complaint is also conclusory when the
plaintiff pleads an element that is directly sensory perceptible, but pleads
the element as though it has not been directly perceived. An agreement
or a conspiracy is a directly-perceptible element: a handshake, an oral
assent, or even a wink and a nod that is the assent to the agreement. But,

180. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1316 (―But a complaint that does provide non-conclusory
allegations on every element of a claim, by definition, exceeds the threshold of plausibly suggesting
an entitlement to relief for purposes of Iqbal step two.‖) (emphasis added).
181. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 47.
182. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009).
183. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
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according to the Court in Twombly, the plaintiffs did not state a claim
even though they alleged that:
Beginning at least as early as February 6, 1996, and continuing to the
present, the exact dates being unknown to Plaintiffs, Defendants and
their co-conspirators engaged in a contract, combination or conspiracy
to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or
high speed internet services markets by, among other things, agreeing
not to compete with one another and to stifle attempts by others to
compete with them and otherwise allocating customers and markets to
one another in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act. 184

The Court found that the plaintiffs were not proceeding on an
allegation of direct agreement: ―[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that
plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not
185
on any independent allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs.‖
The allegations of the ―agreement‖ in Twombly were not describing
some directly perceptible fact—instead they were reciting the element of
the cause of action, and were pleaded as only indirectly perceptible.
To make this distinction clear, I suggest that the plaintiffs would
have stated a claim had they alleged that:
1. [T]he CEOs of each of the [ILECs] reserved a private room at a
high-priced restaurant in Bermuda in January 1996, and then alleged a
second-by-second transcript of exactly what was said by whom at the
meeting as they hatched their conspiratorial regime. 186

With this hypothetical allegation, the plaintiffs would have pleaded the
agreement as a directly perceptible allegation. The Court, despite being
skeptical that any of the plaintiffs were in that room, and without the
plaintiffs producing any documents (such as minutes from the meeting),
would have had to accept this allegation as true—the allegation is nonconclusory.
What is important is whether the plaintiffs were alleging the
agreement as a recitation of the elements of the cause of action or were
directly alleging the agreement. In other words, just because an element
of a claim (e.g., an agreement) can be directly sensory perceptible does
not mean that any time the allegation is used in the complaint it will be
used as sensory perceptible. A complaint can allege a conspiracy but

184. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 551 n.2 (2007).
185. Id. at 564.
186. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1318 n.149 (using the hypothetical pleading to argue that
Twombly and Iqbal cannot be read to require evidentiary support for non-conclusory allegations at
the pleading stage).
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really plead it as an indirectly perceptible element and make allegations
of parallel conduct to show it.
3. Changes to Pleading under this Step
As I did after step one, I pause here to note why this step should
still be unobjectionable to critics of the plausibility inquiry. First, for a
cause of action where all the elements are directly perceptible and the
plaintiff directly pleads each element with sensory perceptible
allegations, a court need not and cannot engage in the plausibility
inquiry. As Professor Steinman has pointed out, in this situation the
187
plausibility inquiry ―vanishes completely.‖
Second, a court cannot require a plaintiff to produce evidence to
back up non-conclusory allegations in the complaint. It is important to
note that the definition of conclusory does not require sensory-perceived
allegations, but instead sensory-perceptible allegations. Confronted with
Iqbal‘s allegations, I personally would find it ―unrealistic‖188 that he had
himself perceived those discussions in the weeks after September 11—
i.e., he had heard Ashcroft and Mueller discussing the policy, or had
heard Ashcroft‘s and Mueller‘s phone calls, or read their emails. I
would also be surprised to find out that the plaintiff had heard this
information from someone else that had actually perceived these
allegations. But none of this matters. As the Supreme Court stated: ―To
be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they
are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of
respondent‘s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature,
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.‖189
Third, I suggest also that the above definition of conclusory,
although not compelled by, is nonetheless consistent with Supreme
Court precedent before Twombly and Iqbal. In Dura Pharmaceuticals,
the plaintiffs alleged that they ―suffered damage[s].‖190 Suffering
economic damages is a directly perceptible allegation—this can be seen
through a lower resale price. But the plaintiffs pleaded that allegation as
though it was only indirectly perceptible. This allegation is conclusory

187. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1316. But, where a plaintiff cannot allege an element of a
cause of action directly—either because the element is only indirectly perceptible, or because the
plaintiff pleads the allegations as a conclusion and pleads the element indirectly with other sensoryperceptible allegations—the court must then proceed to the plausibility analysis on those specific
elements.
188. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
189. Id.
190. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005).
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in the same way that the use of the term ―agreement‖ was conclusory in
Twombly.191 What remains, then, is the discussion of plausibility.
C.

Plausibility

As noted above, up until this point, Twombly and Iqbal have not
significantly changed pleading practice and have not yet introduced the
feared subjectivity into pleading practice. Again, under the first two
steps outlined above, when confronted with a motion to dismiss, a court
should first identify the elements of a claim for relief. A court should
then see if the elements of the claim are directly perceptible, and if so,
whether the plaintiff has directly pleaded those elements with sensoryperceptible allegations. In these types of claims a court cannot engage
in the plausibility inquiry and must deny the motion to dismiss.
But sometimes a claim will contain elements that cannot be directly
perceived, or a plaintiff will plead a directly perceptible element only
indirectly. In these situations, a court must examine whether the
sensory-perceptible allegations that indirectly speak to the missing
element plausibly suggest that the plaintiff will be able to prove the
missing element.
This third step—a court‘s analysis of whether the non-conclusory
allegations that indirectly speak to an element of a cause of action—is
the plausibility inquiry. Before addressing this inquiry, however, I will
first pause to point out several of the practicalities that are involved in
Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice that tend to forestall the necessity of the
plausibility inquiry. This discussion is intended to answer the fears that
Twombly has introduced ―a wild card . . . at the threshold stage of civil
process through which all litigation must pass.‖192
1. Getting to Plausibility
In Taming Twombly, Professor Edward Harnett describes how
district judges can forestall the plausibility inquiry. He points out that,
although ―most commentators[] seem to assume that surviving a
12(b)(6) motion is a prerequisite to discovery, this is simply not the
case.‖193 He continues that, ―the mere filing of a motion to dismiss does

191. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.11 (2007).
192. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
193. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 507.
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not trigger a stay of discovery . . . ‗Discovery need not cease during the
194
pendency of a motion to dismiss.‘‖
A district court that is generally sympathetic to a plaintiff‘s
complaint, but unsure whether the complaint could survive the
plausibility analysis, simply ―could . . . delay decision on the motion to
195
If a court sits on the motion to dismiss, ―by the time
dismiss.‖
briefing and argument on the motion to dismiss is complete, the plaintiff
will have had an opportunity to obtain discovery to support those
196
If this discovery
allegations as to which discovery was needed.‖
while the motion is pending turns up evidence that supports the
plaintiff‘s allegations, a court would likely find that ―justice so requires‖
granting ―leave‖ to amend the complaint to include the new
197
Hartnett also points out that Rule 12(i) ―authorize[s] a
allegations.
district court to defer hearing and decision on a 12(b)(6) motion until
trial.‖198
Even if a district court does entirely dismiss the plaintiff‘s
complaint, the district court can do so with leave to amend the
complaint. This is, in fact, the ―commonly followed‖ practice.199
Indeed, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court specifically provided for this option:
―The Court of Appeals should decide in the first instance whether to

194. Id. at 507 (quoting SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 852 F.2d 936, 945 n.11
(7th Cir. 1988)). Hartnett notes that under Rule 26(c), a court may ―for good cause[] issue an order .
. . forbidding . . . discovery.‖ Id. at 507-08. He points out, though, that the ―issuance of such a stay
is not routine.‖ Id. Hartnett additionally notes that, if courts would normally grant a stay of
discovery while a motion to dismiss was pending, this ―would be to treat a unique provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 as if it applied to all cases.‖ Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §
77z-1(b)(1) (2006)).
195. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 509. Hartnett also notes, however, that in some cases a
defendant may simultaneously file a motion to dismiss and a motion to stay discovery. Id.
Alternatively, he points out that a defendant may simply ―stonewall‖ discovery, a behavior which a
plaintiff may not be able to redress with a motion to compel before the district court makes a
decision on the motion to dismiss. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at n.166; FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
198. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 511; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i) (―If a party so moves, any defense
listed in Rule 12(b)(1)-(7)—whether made in a pleading or by motion— . . . must be heard and
decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.‖).
199. See 5B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1357 n.98 (3d ed.) and accompanying text.
A wise judicial practice (and one that is commonly followed) would be to allow at least
one amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial pleading appears because
except in unusual circumstances it is unlikely that the district court will be able to
determine conclusively on the face of a defective pleading whether the plaintiff actually
can state a claim for relief.
Id. As a matter of course, plaintiff‘s attorneys, when opposing a motion to dismiss, should ask for
the court‘s leave to amend if the court determines that the complaint cannot state a claim.
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remand to the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to amend
his deficient complaint.‖200
Additionally, a motion to dismiss does not always dispose of the
plaintiff‘s entire action. On those claims that survive the partial
dismissal, which generally will form part of the same set of transactions
and occurrences, continued discovery may reveal evidence that would
201
demonstrate that ―justice so requires‖ leave to amend the complaint to
replead those previously dismissed claims. Hartnett also notes that a
district court‘s discretion to help along a deficient claim is ―largely
202
unreviewable.‖
Some cases will, however, require a court to engage in the
plausibility inquiry.
2. Plausibility
Confronted with the necessity of the plausibility inquiry, a court
should carefully examine the complaint and find those allegations that
speak to the element indirectly. As in Iqbal, it should not be necessary
for the plaintiff to specifically link within the complaint which
allegations speak to which elements.203 A court should look at the
allegations cumulatively. The court should then determine whether it
can ―draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.‖204 A court faced with this decision will be
required to apply some amount of ―judicial experience and common
sense.‖205 This is where the inquiry becomes problematic.
How a court determines whether the inference is reasonable is a
difficult question. Professor Bone suggests that, in making this
determination, a court will compare the alleged conduct with a baseline
of conduct and see if the alleged conduct ―differ[s] in some significant

200. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
201. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
202. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 513. ―The major exception to this principle is when qualified
immunity is in play.‖ Id. This explains the language in Iqbal that suggests that discovery should
not proceed during a motion to dismiss. See id.
203. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52.
204. Id. at 1949.
205. Id. at 1950. Professor Scott Dodson notes an interesting aspect of Twombly that remains
unsettled:
[W]ho will determine (and under what standards) what is ―plausible‖ or not? . . . May a
defendant moving to dismiss support his motion with expert opinions that the plaintiffs‘
allegations are not plausible? Must a plaintiff oppose the motion with his own expert‘s
contrary opinions? Must the trial court then convert the motion into one for summary
judgment?
Dodson, supra note 19, at 142.
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way from what usually occurs in the baseline and differ[s] in a way that
supports a higher probability of wrongdoing than is ordinarily associated
206
Professor Bone, although generally
with the baseline conduct.‖
concluding that the ―plausibility standard marks only a modest departure
from traditional notice pleading,‖ recognizes that ―[d]efining the
appropriate baseline will not always be easy, and in any event it involves
a normative judgment.‖207 This is about as accurate of a description of
the analysis as possible. A judge, and the Supreme Court, ―could never
succeed in intelligibly‖ defining the line between speculative and
plausible, but I think that most judges will ―know it when [they] see
208
it.‖
I pause here to point out that excepting the disagreement on the
conclusory nature of several of the allegations, there was surprising
uniformity in the Justices‘ interpretation of the plausibility inquiry in
Twombly (a 7–2 decision) and Iqbal (9–0).
I acknowledge here that the plausibility inquiry does involve some
subjectivity in the use of judicial experience and common sense. In the
next section, I will argue that this subjectivity is not as problematic as
some have suggested.
3. Recasting Twombly and Iqbal: Defending Plausibility Pleading
and Confronting Its Critics
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires a plaintiff to have a
―belief[] formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . .
[that] the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
206. See Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13 at 885-86.
By a ‗baseline,‘ I mean the normal state of affairs for situations of the same general type
as those described in the complaint. The probability of wrongdoing for baseline conduct
is not necessarily zero, but is should be very small, for otherwise the conduct in question
would not be part of a socially acceptable baseline.
Id. Bone explains that he read Twombly as a case determined by what baseline is applied to the
conduct of the telecommunications companies. See id. at 885.
It is tempting to conclude that there must be something amiss when competing firms stay
out of one another‘s markets and use common techniques to deter entry into their own.
But this is an example of a baseline problem. Parallel conduct of this sort might seem
odd when compared to the baseline of competitive behavior in general. But this is the
wrong baseline for the Twombly case. The correct baseline is competitive behavior under
the particular conditions of the telecommunications market. And compared to that
baseline, there is nothing necessarily odd about what the defendants are doing.
Id.
207. See Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 935, 887.
208. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
Breyer provides a modern-day version of this quotation in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700
(2005) (―I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.‖).
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opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . . .‖209 When Rule
11 speaks of ―factual contentions‖ it does not have the same definition as
the definition of non-conclusory that I have provided above. Factual
contentions under Rule 11 are those contentions that are not legal
conclusions. Under Rule 11, a defendant‘s state of mind or purpose,
then, is a factual contention.
Under Rule 11, when a plaintiff alleges that a group of defendants
formed a conspiracy, or alleges that a defendant had a discriminatory
motive, a plaintiff is not required to have evidentiary support for these
contentions. But a plaintiff is required to have a reasonable belief that
210
This
these factual contentions will ―likely have evidentiary support.‖
makes sense—one would not normally expect an individual who got
fired to file a discrimination claim for no reason. The individual will
have some basis for believing that the termination was discriminatory.
Twombly and Iqbal require a plaintiff to plead that basis.211 This
must be done in non-conclusory (sensory-perceptible) allegations, but
this should be no insuperable hurdle for a plaintiff; for those elements of
a claim that a plaintiff does not, or cannot (like discriminatory purpose)
directly allege in a sensory-perceptible allegation, the plaintiff must have
some sensory-perceptible reason for believing that the element is
satisfied. To make the point more clear, I draw again on the above
provided hypothetical allegations of discrimination:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Defendant fired Plaintiff because she was a woman.
During a performance review, Defendant stated that clients have
complained about doing business with a woman.
Plaintiff heard Defendant make a joke and laugh when she exited the
room.
Defendant failed to use gender-neutral language in his inter-office
memoranda.
Defendant fired Plaintiff because of his hostility to women which he
demonstrated by his constant telling of sexist jokes in the office.

A plaintiff can make the allegation that Defendant fired her because
she was a woman. But she cannot plead this in directly perceptible
allegations. By filing the suit though, she believes that the allegation of
discrimination in Allegation 1 will likely have evidentiary support. Why

209. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
210. Id.
211. Professor Hoffman has previously suggested that plausibility ―is probably close—if not
(at least sometimes) equivalent—to the Rule 11(b)(3) proscription against asserting claims for
which there is no evidentiary support and no likelihood of evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further discovery.‖ Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1253-54.
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does she believe this—because of the additional sensory-perceptible
allegations two through five. A court must accept that all of these things
physically happened (aside from the non-conclusory part of allegation
5). The court will then evaluate whether the plaintiff has accurately
predicted whether she will likely find evidence of discrimination.
Under Twombly and Iqbal, then, a Court is simply evaluating
whether the plaintiff has adequately appraised her claim. The Court is
not making any factual determination or weighing any credibility. The
Court is not requiring a plaintiff to produce evidence to back up her
well-pleaded allegations. Instead, the Court is determining whether the
plaintiff‘s reasons for believing that she was discriminated against
suggest that she will be entitled to relief. A plaintiff does not have a new
evidentiary burden under Twombly and Iqbal. Instead, a plaintiff must
reveal to the court what she is already required to have under Rule 11.
The circumstances under which plausibility pleading will lead to a
different result than the traditional system of notice pleading are limited.
This will only occur when a court disagrees with a plaintiff on whether
her reasons for bringing a claim suggest liability. Twombly and Iqbal
should only be feared on policy grounds if one assumes that a plaintiff as
a better ability than a disinterested judge to gauge whether her claim is
more than speculative. To put it another way, is it fair to subject a
defendant to legal costs and the costs of discovery when a plaintiff has
only a hunch?212 In Rule 8(a)‘s terms, a pleading without the plaintiff‘s
reasons for believing that the allegation will likely have evidentiary
support fails to ―show[]‖ that the plaintiff is ―entitled to relief.‖213
Professor Steinman has questioned whether it is appropriate to use
Rule 11‘s certification requirement as a pleading standard. Rule 11
already has its own enforcement mechanism, which is sanctions, and
courts should not commandeer that standard into the 12(b)(6)
adjudication.214 While this may be a valid criticism, my argument is
merely that Twombly and Iqbal do not, practically, require anything new

212. Cf. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 900 (―When proceduralists discuss
pleading standards, they tend to assume that fairness applies just to plaintiffs and that any pleading
standard stricter than liberal notice pleading can be justified only on efficiency grounds.‖). Granted,
though, a court will end up dismissing a case on a mere hunch. But there are still many protections
of plaintiffs in place—need to take the non-conclusory allegations as true—that are in the plaintiff‘s
favor, and, anyway, it seems better to have a neutral third-party—the judge—make this decision
than the interested plaintiff.
213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
214. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1331-32 (―Using Rule 11 as a basis for requiring
supportive allegations at the pleadings phase would, therefore, conflate two separate procedural
issues, contrary to the text and structure of the Federal Rules.‖).
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of plaintiffs. Additionally, this requirement can be tenably derived from
Rule 8(a)‘s language quoted above.
Professor Spencer suggests that the rules of pleading were not
215
intended to screen out claims at the pleading stage, except when the
complaint fails to give the defendant adequate notice. Spencer also
argues that the plausibility pleading standard ―is out of step with the
216
He
larger matrix of rules governing procedure in federal civil cases.‖
suggests that ―although Rule 11(b) allows for the possibility that the
pleader will require discovery to obtain supportive facts, plausibility
217
Rather, plaintiffs are
pleading does not make such an allowance.‖
required to offer such facts at the pleading phase before discovery may
occur.‖218 This characterization, however, misconceives the plausibility
inquiry. Plaintiffs may still plead allegations on which they do not have
supporting facts but on which they anticipate finding facts. Plausibility
simply makes the plaintiffs tell the court why he or she thinks that the
facts will be uncovered. The plaintiff does not, under plausibility
pleading, need the ultimate facts to plead a valid claim—this was
recognized in Twombly itself, where the Court provided examples of
parallel conduct (sensory-perceptible allegations that speak indirectly to
an agreement) that would state a valid claim despite a plaintiff‘s inability
to allege an actual agreement.219
Additionally, the Federal Rules certainly contemplate some case
screening function at the pleading stage. Although the Supreme Court
has traditionally focused on the notice function of the rules, if the
drafters really believed that the pleadings should not be used to screen
out unmeritorious cases, why allow a defendant to move to dismiss for
―failure to state a claim‖?220 The Rule does not allow dismissal for
―failure to give notice.‖ Indeed, the rule expressly provides a procedural
vehicle to remedy a pleading that is not sufficiently specific to give
notice: ―A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading .
. . which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
prepare a response.‖221 If notice was the only goal of the complaint,
Rule 12(e) would sufficiently address this—regardless of the merit of a
215. Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 480.
216. Id. at 469.
217. Id. at 471.
218. Id.
219. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.4 (2007) (providing the example
of ―complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time
by multiple competitors, and made for no other discernible reason‖) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
220. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
221. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
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plaintiff‘s complaint, a defendant will have notice of exactly what events
or transactions the plaintiff is attempting to sue upon.
In dissent in Twombly, Justice Stevens stated that the Court‘s
approach was inconsistent with the Forms appended to the Federal Rules
222
of Civil Procedure.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84, ―[t]he
forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the
223
Form 11224 is a
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.‖
Complaint for Negligence and states:
1.

On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle
against the plaintiff.
2. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income,
suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of
$____.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for $___,
plus costs. 225

The majority in Twombly suggested that its approach was indeed
consistent with this Form.226 Professor Spencer suggests that the Form
―reveals that pleading facts that establish the defendant‘s negligence—
such as the defendant‘s use of a cell phone while driving, operation of
the vehicle at excessive speed, or failure to wear required prescription
spectacles—are not necessary to state a claim.‖227 Requiring a plaintiff
to plead these facts, according to Spencer, would be a problem because
―there would be no way for unwitting victims who are blindsided by
wayward vehicles to state their claims.‖228 This, however, overstates a
plaintiff‘s lack of knowledge. The plaintiff must have, under Rule 11,
some reason to believe that the defendant drove negligently. This may
simply be that she was hit. She will, however, know her own actions,
i.e., whether she was lawfully crossing the street at the time of the
accident.

222. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575-76.
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (emphasis added).
224. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. Some of the commentary on Twombly and Iqbal refers to this as
Form 9. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575-76. The different number is the result of recent style
amendments in the Rules. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 883 n.47 (―After the
recent style amendments, Form 9—a model complaint for automobile negligence—appears as Form
11 and the specific date and location reference in the original have been replaced with
placeholders.‖) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11).
225. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
226. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
227. Spencer, Understanding Pleading, supra note 173, at 26.
228. Id. at 27.
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But it is true that the plaintiff may not be able to specifically allege
what that negligent behavior was. A court, evaluating this complaint,
would have to make a judgment as to whether plaintiff‘s being hit by a
car raises the inference of negligence above the speculative level. Most
would say ―yes.‖ Some may say ―no‖—which is the difficulty in
Twombly and Iqbal. This is fairly criticized as a subjective judgment—a
judgment based on judicial experience and common sense. But the
danger that this presents (that a judge‘s subjective judgment will result
in the dismissal of a potentially meritorious suit) is a remote danger.
This danger, unlike a court‘s ability to help along a deficient claim, is
also subject to judicial review and the above-described three-step
framework will ensure that district judges make the plausibility inquiry
229
to facilitate this review. And this danger must be
transparently
evaluated against the alternative system, where a plaintiff can subject a
defendant to discovery costs by concealing her reasons for filing suit
from the court.
Professor Spencer has summarized what he sees as the conclusion
that can be drawn from a dismissal based on the plausibility inquiry:
―After a Twombly dismissal, observers can only say, ‗He might have had
a claim but he failed to ‗prove‘ it.‘ One cannot say, ‗He did not have a
claim‘ or ‗His claim was groundless.‘‖230 This mischaracterizes the
inquiry. Rather, after a Twombly dismissal, one can say ―He may have a
claim but he has no good reason to think so.‖
V. CONCLUSION
Above I have proposed a three-step process to aid courts in
adjudication of a motion to dismiss after Twombly and Iqbal. This
approach is designed (1) to ensure that the plausibility inquiry is
relegated to its proper role as an inquiry of last resort and (2) to ensure
that, when necessary, the plausibility inquiry will be done transparently
to facilitate judicial review. This approach helps to ameliorate many of
the criticisms of Twombly, as can a district judge‘s exercise of case
management discretion to help insufficient claims along.
I also conclude, however, that the plausibility inquiry, in light of
Rule 11, can provide a helpful case-screening function that is preferable
to the alternative pleading system where a plaintiff‘s appraisal of her

229. Additionally, if the plausibility inquiry really does, as Professor Bone describes, involve a
comparison of the alleged conduct with a baseline of normal conduct, there will likely be some
pressure on judges to avoid dismissing claims that allege lawful but politically incorrect action.
Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 882.
230. Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 483.
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own claim opens the doors to federal court without any judicial
involvement.
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